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ABSTRACT  
 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between board monitoring mechanism, continuous 
training and financial reporting quality in Malaysian context. The paper employed a sample 
of top 100 Malaysia firms identified by the Malaysia Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
between the periods 2010-2011. Feasible GLS (FGLS) regression estimation method was 
used to test the relationship between the dependent variable of interest. The regression result 
reveals that while the proportion of grey directors in boardroom positively and significantly 
relates with both accrual and real earnings management, the proportion of independent 
directors was negative, but not significant. Board continuous training and outsourcing of 
internal audit function is however negatively and significantly affects accrual and real 
earnings management. The study’s findings have implication for future regulatory initiative, 
as our result suggests that board mechanisms, specifically, board composition are not 
effective in improving the quality of reported figures. This study extend previous studies by 
testing whether board experience measured by the number of continuous education training 
program- trainings relating to corporate governance and financial reporting attended by 
board members improve the quality of financial reporting.  
 
Keywords: board continuous training, grey directors, independent director, and internal 
audit function.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Events in the past years, especially those related to financial crisis and the collapse of large 
companies, partly due to earnings manipulation and overly aggressive financial reporting, 
bring forth regulatory interventions. These events ignited the issuance and review of codes of 
corporate governance around the globe. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and the 
Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012). Codes of corporate 
governance across the globe are unequivocal on the dominance of independent directors on 
corporate board and subcommittee in ensuring international best practice. The reviewed code 
(MCCG 2012) gives some recommendation on how to strengthen corporate governance 
practise in order to curb corporate malfeasances. Key among the recommendations is 
strengthening and reinforcing board independence and fostering board commitment. MCCG 
2012 reemphasised the significant role of independent directors, separation of CEO and the 
chairperson role in internal control monitoring.   
 
In addition, the new code makes provision for board continuous education programme. 
MCCG 2012 makes a case for the role of internal audit function in monitoring and enhancing 
the quality of the financial report. Although the role of and function of internal audit 
department is well entrenched in the earlier version, MCCG 2012 extends this role by 
mandating the establishment of internal audit function for all listed firms and mandating the 
disclosure of information regarding its function in the annual report among other provisions. 
A priori, when agent incentive is aligned with the interest of the principal, agency cost 
reduces (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
 
In essence, the primary purpose of these provisions is to strengthen governance practice 
among Malaysia public listed firms by ensuring sound corporate governance practice. As 
noted by Lin and Hwang (2010), “good corporate governance structure helps to ensure that 
management properly utilizes the enterprise resources in the best interest of absentee owners 
and fairly report financial condition and operating performance of the enterprise”.  Globally, 
the Codes of Corporate Governance recommend more inclusion of independent non-
executive directors.  The rationale for this requirement is that independent non-executive 
directors provide independent monitoring and objective evaluation of management activities 
since they are not socially tied to management (Fama & Jensen 1983). Therefore, their 
mission on board is to protect the interest of the shareholders by preventing management 
distortionary activities. Consistent with the notion that independent non-executive director on 
board improves company governance (Hsu & Wu 2014), corporate governance studies have 
mainly focused on independent directors’ role on corporate board (Borokhovich, Boulton, 
Brunarrski, & Harman 2014). However, empirical findings from extant studies that examine 
the role of independent non-executive directors are inconsistent regrading the impact of 
independent directors on board  (Lin & Hwang 2010).  
 
Similarly, the role of non-independent non-executive directors otherwise called grey directors 
is yet to receive much empirical attention. Thus, the role of grey directors is not well 
understood in corporate governance literatures. By their nature, grey directors have social ties 
with the company’s management, hence lack independence, and does not resolve the agency 
conflict. It is due to this reason that prior studies and in fact regulator rarely advocates for 
their role. Interestingly, new evidence emerging from the literature suggests that the 
economic and personal tie between the company (management) and directors as obtainable in 
grey directorship help align board interest with the shareholders. Westphal (1999); Hsu and 
Wu (2014) report that social tie between board of directors and management encourage 
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synergy. Management are more willingly to solicit for board advisory advice and the board of 
directors are as well incentivise to provide an adequate advisory service, which will 
eventually improve performance. For example, as opined by Borokhovich et al. (2014), share 
ownership by grey directors motivates them to behave like independent non-executive 
directors. Hsu and Wu (2014) report that, the under representation of grey directors on board 
inhibit board advisory function which makes firms susceptible to failure. Hsu and Wu (2014) 
finding is consistent with board collaborative hypothesis. The board collaborative hypothesis 
extend the role and function of the board of directors beyond monitoring to include the 
provision of advisory functions.  
 
In another vein, extant studies theorized that good corporate governance extends beyond 
balance composition of independent directors. Board experience, skills, and knowledge are as 
well vital to the successful delivery of board charter (Gul & Leung 2004; Keasey & Hudson 
2002). As earlier mentioned, part of the requirements of the MCCG 2012 is the board 
continuous training program. This is necessary due to the high level of uncertainty that 
characterized business and economic landscape. Board members need to update their 
knowledge and skills to match up with the changing dynamics of the business through 
continuous training program. This makes board members resourceful and equipped with 
better horn skill require for charting the company's course efficiently. An example is the 
recent global adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). Board of 
directors needs a good understanding of accounting practices as the majority of their 
functions revolves round financial reporting (Keasey & Hudson, 2002). 
 
Although numerous studies (Ahmed & Duellman 2007; Al-Dhamari & Ku Ismail 2014; 
Armstrong et al., 2014) establish a link between sound corporate governance and earning 
management (proxy for financial reporting quality). In this paper, we extend previous studies 
by investigating the extent to which some specific provisions in the MCCG 2012 improve 
financial reporting quality. Specifically, we test the effect of independent non-executive 
directors, grey directors, board continuous training, and internal audit sourcing arrangement 
based on the sample of  top 100 Malaysian firm identified by the Malaysia Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (MSWG) between the periods 2010-2011. 
 
 Using discretionary accrual earnings management and real earnings management (i.e. 
abnormal production, abnormal CFO, and abnormal expenses) as measures of financial 
reporting quality, our result suggests that grey director is significantly and positively related 
to absolute discretionary accrual. However, the number of grey directors scaled by board size 
does not have any significant relation with our proxy for earnings management. Board of 
director’s continuous education and training reveals a negative, but not a significant 
relationship in all our measures of financial reporting. Similarly, internal audit function 
outsourcing arrangement is significantly positively associated with absolute discretionary 
accruals. Likewise, using real earnings management proxies the result of internal audit 
outsourcing has positive, but not significant influence on abnormal production and abnormal 
expenses. For abnormal CFO, outsourcing arrangement has negative insignificant impact.  
Our study contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance by focusing on new 
perspective concerning the relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Specifically, we contribute by examining the role of grey directors 
and board of director’s continuous training in improving the quality of reported financial 
information. The inclusion of grey director’s members on board should improve board 
advisory role due to the fact that board social tie with management build a relationship that 
improves board-management working relationship. Consistent with previous studies, 
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(Beasley 1996), we contend that the inclusion of more independent non-executive directors 
on the board of directors should improve board monitoring effectiveness. In addition, board 
knowledge, as evidenced by the number of continuous training programmes attended by 
board member should add more value to this effectiveness. From a policy point of view, our 
result suggests that boardroom composition as measured by the proportion of grey directors 
and independent directors in boardroom are weak in improving the quality of reported 
figures. However, the results of board continuous training and outsourcing of Choosing a 
time period surrounding the revision of MCCG whose various provisions are expected to 
improve quality of reported figure, our findings produce valuable insights into how board 
composition and  process affect the quality of reported financial figures. 
  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of related literature and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 is the research design detailing sample selection process, 
measurement and estimation techniques. The study’s analysis and finding are presente in 
section 4, and section 5 includes the conclusion of the study.  
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1 Board composition and financial reporting quality  
The board of directors is the highest decision-making body in companies (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The body is saddle with the pivotal role of monitoring and evaluating the performance 
of top-level management. However, the extent to which board discharges this function is 
determined by the composition of the board. A well composed board is an essential 
governance tool that affects managerial decision in the contemporary business environment 
(Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui, 2011). A balanced board should have the right mix of independent 
non-executive directors and non-independent executive directors (grey director). It also 
requires that board members should be made up of right combination of knowledge, 
expertise, skill and establishing appropriate board committees as the case maybe dictate.  
As mentioned earlier, the board is primary saddled with the responsibilities of monitoring and 
advising top management (Westphal, 1999). All existing corporate governance theories 
(agency theory inclusive) tout board independence as a vital ingredient necessary to achieve 
board statutory responsibilities (Hoitash, 2011). Empirical investigation into the governance 
structures of firms indicates that board structures dominated by independent non-executive 
directors provide superior performance monitoring. While, Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
report that firm performance increase with the additional representation of independent 
directors, Beasley (1996) reveals that, the numbers of independent directors reduce the 
probability of fraud incidence. Dalton and Daily (2001) investigate investors reaction to the 
presence of independent directors during IPOs. Findings from their study shows that 
investors react positively to the presence of independent directors as investors are of the 
opinion that independent directors will avoid joining board with low quality as it may damage 
their reputation. Bushman and Smith (2003) report a positive relationship between timeliness 
and proportion of outside directors. The presence of independent directors on the corporate 
encourage timely report bad news (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed & Buellman, 2007), which 
increase earnings informativeness (Petra, 2006; Al-Dhamari & Ismail, 2014). Similarly, 
Bowen et al. (2008), Klein (2002), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Armstrong et al. (2014) 
demonstrate that independent directors enhance board monitoring, thereby constrained 
earnings management, which lead to increased corporate transparency.  
 
Though the majority of the studies suggest that as more independent directors are present on 
board, financial reporting quality improves, some other literature suggests otherwise. In 
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reality, some authors argue that independent directors lack sufficient knowledge about the 
company’s operation and their independence compromised (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991; 
Patton & Baker, 1987). Therefore, in the presence of these factors independent directors 
cannot effectively discharge their monitoring function. In examining the monitoring role of 
independent directors in family-controlled business, Abdullah et al. (2010), Mohammed et al. 
(2012); Aishah and Ibrahim (2013) did not find evidence that the number of independent 
directors strengthen board monitoring. While, Al-Dhamari and Ku Ismail (2014) reveals that 
independent directors reduce earnings ability to predict future cash flows in the Malaysian 
context. Other studies, Vefeas (2002) finds no statistical support to justify the claim that 
independent directors help improve the relationship between reported earnings and share 
return. Abdullah and Nasir (2004); Saleh et al. (2005); Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006); Osma 
and Noguer (2007) report an insignificant relationship between independent directors and 
earnings management. Despite the conflicting findings, the agency theory and the 2012 
MCCG code suggest that, the presence of more independent non-executive director improves 
board monitoring and financial reporting process, our study hypothesis that: 
 
H1: The higher the proportion of independent director the higher the financial 
reporting quality   
 
The first hypothesis now leads us to our the second hypothesis. Contrary to the widely held 
believe that the board of director’s close ties with management obstruct board processes; 
recent empirical evidence suggests that it rather improves board effectiveness (Hoitash, 
2011). Falaye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011) argued that both independent non-executive 
directors and grey directors improve board-monitoring role, but the later performs better in an 
advisory role. Westphal (1999) developed a collaborative board model where he 
demonstrated that “Board social tie with outside directors enhances the propensity of top 
managers to solicit their advice on strategic issue while also increasing the outside directors 
tendency to offer such advice”. 
 
A substantial number of literatures provide evidence on the benefits of including balanced 
proportion of grey directors inside the boardroom. For instance, Hsu and Wu (2014) found 
that, dominance of grey directors on the board reduces the likelihood of firm’s failure. In 
relation to CEO replacement, Borokhovich et al. (2014) noted that in the absence of 
succession plan, grey directors put the interest of shareholders first and are more disposed to 
hire a high-quality replacement. While Beasley (1996) provided evidence suggesting that 
firms that experienced financial statement fraud have few number of grey directors inside the 
boardroom, Hoitash (2011) documented that a material weakness in internal control and firm 
financial misstatement is less when social ties exist between managers and directors.  Based 
on the previous argument, when independent directors (i.e. grey directors) are bonded, there 
are a greater chance that financial reporting quality will increase. Therefore, we hypothesise 
that: 
H2: The higher the proportion of grey directors the greater the financial reporting 
quality.   
 
2.2 Board Continuous Training and Financial Reporting Quality  
Good corporate governance extends beyond balance composition of independent directors. 
Board experience, skills, and knowledge are as well vital to the successful delivery of board 
charter (Gul & Leung, 2004; Keasey & Hudson, 2002). The contemporary business 
environment is characterised by high level of uncertainty due to changes in business and 
economic landscape. As such, board members are required to update their knowledge and 
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skill along these changes through continuous educational training. To say the least, 
continuous education training programme for board members is a key requirement of the 
MCCG 2012. Keasey and Hudson (2002) and Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) agreed that 
independent and non-executive directors need a good understanding of accounting practices 
since most of their functions revolve around financial reporting. Hence, companies are 
investing heavily in director’s training. This is in part due to rapid changes in the regulatory 
environment. Thus, board training programme is designed to keep board members abreast of 
changes in the environment in order to enhance board job-specific knowledge and skill. 
Morin and Renaud (2004) investigated the effect of corporate university training on 
employees’ job performance. Findings from their study reveal a linear relationship between 
job performance and corporate university training, suggesting that corporate university 
training improves job performance. Several others studies investigate the effect of training on 
the business result and found that it is positively associated with productivity, quality, labour 
turnover and the financial result (Sanchez et al., 2003). Bartel (1994), Bishop (1994), Huselid 
(1995), and D’Arcimoles (1997) findings are consistent and indicates that firm’s that invest 
heavily on employee training receive returns in terms of profitability. Since all the study 
reviewed on the role of training are suggestive of positive benefits to the firm, we therefore 
hypothesise that: 
 
H3: The higher the number of financial and corporate governance training 
programmes attended by board members during the financial year the higher 
the financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3 Internal audit function sourcing arrangements and financial reporting quality  
Internal audit function has gained prominence in the recent time due to its important 
monitoring role. As information, asymmetry arises due to separation of ownership from 
control, so also does the incentive of top-level management differs from those at the lower 
level and this create internal agency cost (Ettredge et al., 2000). Accordingly, the internal 
audit function serves as an effective monitoring mechanisms use by the top-level 
management to assess the effective deployment of firm’s resources by managers. Consistent 
with agency theory, top-level management incur cost (otherwise called bonding cost) to 
convince their principal that the company’s internal control process and risk management are 
effective (Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011). Among the types of bonding cost is the 
amount invested in internal audit function. The top-level management could either outsource 
an internal audit function or create a department (in-house) to oversee the function. Although, 
outsourcing internal audit function could be justified on a company’s strive to reduce cost and 
improve efficiency (Swanger & Chewning, 2001) through economies of scale and 
specialization. However, concerns abound most especially on the cost of outsourcing or 
retaining internal audit function in-house.  
 
Consistent with the economic bonding theory, literature advocate that outsourcing internal 
audit to external auditors impair their independence due to lucrative remuneration (Lindberg 
& Beck, 2004; Simunic, 1984). Consequently, this practice results to fraudulent financial 
figures. Abott et al. (2007) found that companies with an effective audit committee are less 
likely to outsource the routine function to external auditors. Other issues aside economic 
bonding highlighted by Prawitt et al. (2012) when inter audit is outsourced is that, outsourced 
internal auditor lacks proper understanding of internal  control process and good 
understanding of the business itself. More so, the extent of outsource internal auditor’s 
commitment and using the right audit procedure as client situation demand are issues 
highlighted by Prawitt et. (2012). The presence of one or all of these issues may as well affect 
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the quality of reported figures. In contrast, knowledge spillover theorists suggest that 
outsourcing the internal audit function improves the quality of the financial report. Prawitt et 
al., (2012) examine the risk associated with outsourcing internal audit procedure to external 
auditors. Prawitt et al., (2012) found evidence consistent with knowledge spillover theory 
which suggest that the risk of financial misstatement will reduce by 23 percent when internal 
audit functions are outsourced to external auditors. Based on the conflicting arguments this 
study hypothesis that 
 
H4: There is a relationship between outsourcing of internal audit function and 
financial reporting quality  
 
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
This study focus on the top companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia as rated 
by the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) in 2011. The selection criteria as 
provided for in MSWG 2011 annual report is based on the level of compliance with best 
practices, quality of disclosure, financial stability, and commitment to corporate social 
responsibility initiatives. We observe the companies over four year periods from the year 
2010 to 2013. Firms operating in the financial sector were eliminated due to the variation in 
financial reporting requirements with other companies. In addition, we exclude firms with 
missing financial information for the sample period. Table 1 Panel A gives the full summary 
of our selection process while Panel B provides the industry breakdown of the sample firm. 
We end up with 300 firm year observations. 
 
3.2 Measurement of dependent, experimental and control variables  
Dependent Variable: To proxy for financial reporting quality (FRQ), both the discretionary 
accrual earnings management and real earnings management are used to assess FRQ. We 
estimate discretionary accrual earnings management using Kothari et al. (2005) performance 
matched cross-sectional model. Performance matched accrual is necessary in order to control 
for firm extreme performance. Thus, consistent with Kothari et al. (2005) we included ROA 
as an explanatory variable in our accrual model. Following previous studies such as Warfield 
et al. (1995) and Frankel et al. (2002), we use absolute value of discretionary accruals as it 
captures the effect of both income increasing and income-decreasing accrual earnings 
management. The model is as described below in equation 1 
 
𝑇𝐴
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡−1
= 𝜕1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+  𝜕2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝜕3
𝑃𝑃𝐸
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝜕𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 
 
Where: 
TA= total accruals computed as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations and operating cash flows 
Asset t-1 = lagged of total asset  
∆REV= change in revenues  
∆REC= change in receivable  
PPE= property, plant and equipment  
ROA t-1 = lagged return on asset calculated as net income before extraordinary items of the 
prior period divided by lagged total asset.  
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Discretionary accruals (DA) are residuals obtained from equation one consistent with Mitral 
et al. (2009) and we run the cross-sectional regression for each industry and year. 
Since firms are likely to employ real operational activities to manipulate earnings when their 
ability to manage through discretionary method is constrained due to strict regulations 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), we as well examine real earnings management activities over the 
sample period. We adopt Roychowdhury (2006) proxies for our real earnings management 
estimation. We generate the normal level of cash flow from operation (CFO) for each 
industry and year using equation 2 below:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2 
Where all other variables are as previously defined except for; 
CFOit =  the actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO calculated using the estimated from 
equation 2. 
Salest = sales during period t  
Δsalesit = Salest – Salest-1 
Next, we model the normal level of discretionary expenses using equation 3  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 3 
All the variables in the model are defined previously except for; 
DISCit = DISC is discretionary expenditures calculated as the sum of advertising expenses, 
R&D expenses and selling, general, and administrative expenses.  
In addition, we estimate normal level of production cost as: 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
+
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 4 
 
All the variables are consistent with previous definition, in addition: 
PRODit = production cost, calculated as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and changes 
in inventory during the year. The residual  is obtained from equation 5 and equation 6. 
  
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … … . 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 5 
 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡−1
=  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . . 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 6 
Note: Abnormal CFO, abnormal production cost, and abnormal discretionary expenses are 
the difference between the actual value and the normal levels predicted in equation (2), (3), 
and (4).  
 
Table 1 
Sample selection and industry breakdown of the sample firm 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Number of  
Observation 
% 
Initial sample of firms with sectors reported in MSWG 
(2011) 
100  
Less: firms operating in the financial sector 10  
Less: firms with missing data 15  
IPBJ Vol. 7(2), 40-57 (2015)     48 
 
Final sample 75  
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry   
Construction 16 5.3 
Consumer 36 12 
Industrial product 56 18.7 
IPC 12 4 
Plantation 36 12 
Properties 36 12 
Trade and services 108 36 
Total 300 100 
 
3.3 Estimation method  
We employed Feasible GLS (FGLS) estimation techniques, which takes care of 
contemporaneous correlation
1
 and heteroscedasticity
2
 in panel data. The FGLS is more 
suitable for analyses for estimation bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity. Accordingly, 
the below model is developed.  
Empirical model  
𝐹𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 + μRQ …. .... ....  .....  .....  
.... .... .... equation 7 
Where:  
FRQit = Accrual earnings management and real earnings management; 
GRYDit= Number of grey director scaled by board size; 
BODTit= Board training measured by the log of number of corporate training that board 
members attended during the financial year;   
OUTSOURCEit = Dummy variable 1 for firms that outsource internal control function and 0 
if otherwise;  
INDit =Number of independent directors scaled by board size;  
BIG4it = a dummy variable 1 for big4 audit firm and 0 if otherwise.  
LOGAFit = log of audit fees;  
LOGTAit = log of total asset;  
QUICK RATIOit = current asset minus inventory divided by total current liabilities;  
CFOit = cash flow from operating activities divided by lagged total asset;  
 ROAit = Net profit before tax divided by total asset;  
CURRENTit =current assets divided by total assets;  
DEBTit = total debt divided by total equity.  
Finally, we control for variation between year and industry. 
 
4.0 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our regression analysis. 
From the table the mean value of ABDAC, ABCFO and ABEXP are 0.339, 0.109, and 1.528 
respectively. While, the mean value for the proportion of grey directors (GRYD) is 2.187, 
that of the independent directors (IND) is 4.137 indicating that the number of independent 
directors in boardroom is more than the proportion of grey directors, which is consistent with 
                                                          
1
 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data fail to reject the hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation as the P-value is 0.00525.  
2 Likewise, the Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression model fail is significant at 0.000 percent 
suggesting the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
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the requirement of the MCCG. Meanwhile, the average number of training attended by the 
directors during the year is approximately four (4) training programmes with maximum of 36 
training attended by the directors.. Further, 48% of the sampled firm outsourced their internal 
audit function with about 90% of the sampled firms been audited by big4 audit firm. The 
average audit fees paid by the sampled firm is RM94,497 during the sampled period and the 
average size of the sampled companies as measure by total asset (TA) is  RM7,449,434.  
Table 3 report the correlation statistic among the explanatory variables used in our regression 
analysis. On the overall, majority of our explanatory variables falls below the threshold value 
of 0.80 as indicated in econometrics literature (see Gujarati, 2004). The implication of this is 
that the degree of Multicollinearity between our variables is not severe. In addition, the mean 
VIF of 2.29 as displayed in table 4 suggest that our result is not likely to be adversely 
affected by Multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and Univariate result of continuous variable 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ABDAC 299 0.339 2.156 0.000 25.725 
ABCFO 299 0.107 0.493 0.000 7.058 
ABEXP 299 1.528 4.427 0.000 37.445 
ABPROD 298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
GRYD 300 2.187 1.856 0. 9 
IND 300 4.137 1.305 0 9 
BODT 287 3.983 4.451 0 36 
OUTSOURCE 300 0.480 0.500 0 1 
BIG4 300 0.907 0.291 0 1 
AF (‘000) 300 96497.630 344971.400 0.400 2538000 
TA (“000) 300 7449434 13500000 44621 99000000 
QUICKRATIO 292 105.248 964.295 0.150 10939 
CFO 300 275540.700 676616.600 123 4569500 
ROA 297 0.673 4.481 -0.090 51.119 
CURRENT 296 2795521 4292254 20808 25000000 
DEBT 300 20658.240 130214 -0.996 1178385 
Variable definition 
 ABDAC = Absolute discretionary accruals computed from cross-sectional performance 
adjusted accrual model of Kothari et al., (2005); ABCFO =  absolute value of abnormal cash 
flow from operating activities and ABEXP = absolute value of abnormal expenses as 
measured (Roychowdhury, 2006). ABPROD = abolsute value of abnormal discretionary 
production; ABDAC, ABPROD, ABCFO, and ABEXP are our measure of financial reporting 
quality. Other variables are as defined above. 
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Table 3 
Correlation statistic for variables used in the main analyses (n= 300) 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ABDAC 1 
               2 ABCFO 0.35 1 
              3 ABEXP 0.61 0.71 1 
             4 ABPROD 0.27 0.36 0.55 1 
            5 GRYD 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.03 1 
           6 BODT -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.10 1 
          7 OUTSOURCE -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.31 1 
         8 IND -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.13 1 
        9 BIG4 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.07 1 
       10 AF (‘000) -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.23 -0.09 0.22 0.17 0.08 1 
      11 TA(‘000) 0.03 0.13 0.04 -0.03 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.30 0.07 0.33 1 
     12 QUICKRATIO 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 -0.11 0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 1 
    13 CFO 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.34 0.11 0.37 0.87 -0.02 1 
   14 ROA 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.09 -0.10 -0.18 0.56 -0.06 1 
  15 CURRENT 0.03 0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.27 0.05 0.36 0.89 -0.06 0.65 -0.20 1 
 16 DEBT 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.16 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 0.77 -0.02 0.80 -0.10 1 
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4.3 Multivariate panel data result 
Table 3 provides the result of the FGLS estimation technique for the four (4) models based on 
FGLS estimation techniques. However before the discussion of the analysis, it is noteworthy 
to state that the result of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no effect in the cross sectional unit over the period as the P-value is 0.000 
suggesting that pool OLS is not appropriate. The Hausman test result shows that FE model is 
preferable to the random effect model. 
In model 1, absolute discretionary accruals (ABDAC) was regressed on the ratio of grey 
directors (GRYD) in boardroom, the ratio of independent directors (IND) in boardroom, 
board continuous training (BODT) and firm internal audit sourcing arrangement 
(OUTSOURCE) with other firm specific controls. The result shows the coefficient of the 
grey director to be significantly positive at 1 percent level (t-value of 3.520); suggesting that 
the ratio of grey directors inside the boardroom reduce the quality of reported figures in the 
financial statement. Our findings contrast the theoretical arguments of Westphal (1999), 
Falaye et al. (2001), Hoitash (2011) that argued that the grey directors in boardroom improve 
board performance because grey directors are good in advisory capacity. The regression 
coefficient on the proportion of independent directors was negative, which indicates that 
independent directors are efficient in monitoring capacity. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
board continuous training (BODT) and firm internal audit function arrangement 
(OUTSOURCE) are negatively significant at 5 percent (t-value of -2.210) and 1 percent (t-
value of -2.272) respectively.  
 
 IPBJ Vol. 7(2), 40-57 (2015)     52 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Multivariate panel data result  
 DISCRETIONAR
Y ACCRUAL 
REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT VIF 
 MODEL 
1(ABDAC) 
MODEL 
2(ABCFO) 
MODEL 
3(ABEXP) 
MODEL 4 
(ABPROD) 
 
GRYD 0.166 0.088 1.063 0.000 1.4
8 
 (3.520***) (2.28***) (1.830**) (-0.83)  
IND 0.027 0.064 0.075 0.000 1.5
6 
 (-0.52) (-1.51) (-0.13) (-4.340***)  
BODT -0.014 -0.006 0.111 0.000 1.3
5 
 (-2.210***) (0.780) -1.000 (2.230***)  
OUTSOURC
E 
-0.036 -0.031 -0.083 0.000 1.2
8 
 (-2.720***) (-2.730) (-0.520) (3.720***)  
BIG4 0.050 0.004 0.092 0.000 1.1
5 
 (2.180***) (-0.290) (-0.500) (-0.180)  
LOGTA -0.004 0.003 -0.038 0.000 2.6
5 
 (-0.520) (-0.470) (-0.410) (-1.810)  
LOGAF -0.003 0.001 0.025 0.000 1.3
0 
 (-1.620) (-0.674) (-0.890) (-1.160)  
QUICKRAT
IO 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.5
7 
 (-1.840**) (-2.160) (-0.500) (-0.810)  
CFO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.9
0 
 (-1.320) (-0.880) (-0.510) (-0.170)  
ROA -0.045 0.031 -0.038 0.000 2.9
2 
 (-0.700) (-0.840) (-0.080) (-2.800***)  
CURRENT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.9
0 
 (2.270***) (-0.220) (-0.550) (-0.370)  
DEBIT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.4
6 
 (-2.780***) (2.390***) (-1.370) (-3.370***)  
YEAR & 
INDUSTRY 
YES YES YES YES  
_cons -0.009 -0.047 0.601 0.000  
 (-0.080) (-0.600) (-0.500) (-3.520***)  
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Mean VIF     2.2
9 
NO Obs 300 300 300 300  
F-statistic  0.0000     
Variable definition 
ABDAC = Absolute discretionary accruals computed from cross-sectional performance 
adjusted accrual model of Kothari et al., (2005); ABPROD = abolsute value of abnormal 
discretionary production; ABCFO =  absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operating 
activities and ABEXP = absolute value of abnormal expenses as measured (Roychowdhury, 
2006). ABDAC, ABPROD, ABCFO, and ABEXP are our measure of financial reporting 
quality. Other variables are as defined above. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001indicate level of significance. 
 
 
In model 2, the absolute value of abnormal cash flow (ABCFO) was regressed on the ratio of 
grey directors (GRYD) in boardroom, the ratio of independent directors (IND) in board room, 
the log of board continuous training  (BODT) and firm internal audit function arrangement 
(OUTSOURCE), with other control variables. The coefficient on GRYD is positively 
significant at 1 percent level (t-value of 2.280) consistent with the findings in the first model, 
thus indicating that the proportion of grey directors inside the boardroom reduce the quality 
of reported figures.  
 
Similarly, the coefficient of IND and BODT is negative but not significant while the firm 
outsourcing arrangement is negatively significant at 1 per cent (t-value 2.272), which indicate 
that outsourcing internal audit function to external firms improves the quality of reported 
figures. Just like the previous two models, the proportion of grey directors is positive and 
significant in model 3 however, it turns negative and insignificant in model 4.  Likewise, the 
proportion of independent directors in boardroom is negative and insignificant in model two 
(2) but it became significant in model 4. Furthermore, BODT and OUTSOURCE coefficient 
are negative and not significant. In model (4), both variables turned positive and were 
significant. 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION  
 
In the present study, we investigate the link between corporate governance mechanisms with 
emphasis on grey directors, independent directors, director financial related training, and 
internal audit function sourcing arrangement and financial reporting quality. We focused on 
the period 2010-2013 following the review of the code of corporate governance. Using 300 
firm’s year observations for firms listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia, our FGLS 
result shows that the proportion of grey directors in boardroom significantly induce 
managerial discretionary accrual manipulation, thus reducing the quality of reported figures. 
Board training reveals a coefficient sign that indicate that board training reduce accrual 
earnings management thus, improving the quality of reported figures. In our real earnings 
management models, the coefficient signs of the explanatory variables remain similar with 
the coefficients of variables in model 1 though, with the exception of few variables in model. 
Thus, we find evidence suggesting that firm OUTSOURCING arrangement and board 
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continuous training improves the quality of reported financial information. Although, across 
the model, the sign of the coefficient of the proportion of independent directors in boardroom 
is negative, but not significant. The implication of this finding is that the independent 
directors are not able to make significant impact in the board even though all the criteria 
requires for their independent as enshrined in the code of corporate governance is adequately 
met. It is likely that since their appointment is subject to management nomination, some form 
of indirect social ties might still exist between them. The study contributes to the extant 
literature by focusing on the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms in improving the 
quality of reported financial information in the wake of MCCG 2012.  
 
Nevertheless, it is imperative to state that several literatures exist in this context, our study 
provides fresh insight to the understanding of how the presence of grey directors affects 
reported figures. Secondly, we provide insight as to whether listed companies investment in 
training provides value with respect to the quality of reported figures. From policy 
perspectives, our result implies that regulatory authorities need to further strengthened 
composition most especially as it relates to the nomination of independent directors in order 
to improve the quality of reported accounting information. This assertion is consistent with 
the view of earlier studies like Ismail et al. (2009), Abdullah et al. (2010),  and Al-Dhamar 
and Ismail (2014). Future studies could expand the sample of this study to give a more robust 
finding. Secondly, future studies could further expand this model to include some 
institutional factors such as political connections, ethnicity, and activities of institutional 
investors to gain further understanding on how the explanatory variables interact with them.   
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